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Political	leadership	in	the	Cold	War’s	ending:
Thatcher	and	the	turn	to	engagement	with	the	Soviet
Union
Archie	Brown	draws	on	his	latest	book	to	discuss	Margaret	Thatcher’s	role	in	the	end	of	the	Cold
War,	which	he	argues	was	more	significant	than	commonly	believed.	He	writes	that	no	alternative
Conservative	leader	would	have	enjoyed	the	close	relationship	she	enjoyed	with	Reagan,	while	it	is
highly	questionable	whether	an	alternative	British	prime	minister	would	have	made	such	a	strong
impact	on	Gorbachev.
The	Cold	War	began	just	after	the	Second	World	War	with	the	Soviet	takeover	of	Eastern	Europe.	It
ended	at	the	close	of	1989,	by	which	time	those	countries	had	become	non-Communist	and
independent	without	a	shot	being	fired	by	a	Soviet	soldier.	Political	leadership	played	a	decisive	role	in	bringing
about	such	dramatic	change.	Central	to	it	was	the	triangular	relationship	of	Mikhail	Gorbachev,	Ronald	Reagan	and
Margaret	Thatcher.	The	most	crucial	person	in	the	trio	was	Gorbachev,	and	by	dint	of	his	office	and	the	power	of	his
country,	Reagan	was	his	most	essential	interlocutor.	But	the	most	surprising	member	of	the	trio	was	Thatcher.
When	Konstantin	Chernenko	died	in	March	1985,	Mikhail	Gorbachev	was	alone	among	the	ten	remaining	members
of	the	Politburo	(until,	as	party	leader,	he	was	able	to	bring	in	several	like-minded	allies)	in	seeking	radical	political
reform	and	in	his	readiness	to	transform	Soviet	foreign	policy	in	the	face	of	resistance	from	the	powerful	military-
industrial	complex	and	their	supporters	within	the	party-state	hierarchy.
The	Soviet	economy	in	most	respects	lagged	far	behind	that	of	the	United	States,	but	it	was	not	in	crisis	in	1985.	If,
as	is	commonly	assumed,	it	was	economic	necessity	which	forced	a	change	of	course,	it	is	odd	that	it	took
Gorbachev	five	years	of	his	less	than	seven	in	the	Kremlin	before	he	embraced	a	market	economy	in	principle	–
and	still	not	in	practice.	The	economy	in	1990-91	was	in	limbo	–	no	longer	a	functioning	command	economy	but	not
yet	marketized.	The	Soviet	Union	had	ceased	to	exist	before	a	market	economy	was	created	during	Boris	Yeltsin’s
presidency	when,	along	with	a	necessary	freeing	of	prices,	Russia’s	rich	natural	resources	were	sold	off	to	pre-
selected	buyers	in	crooked	deals	which	a	disempowered	Gorbachev	deplored.
Rather	than	economic	crisis	in	the	mid-1980s	forcing	radical	economic	reform,	it	was	political
reform	that	provoked	crisis	–	of	the	economy	and	of	Soviet	statehood.	Liberalization	and
democratization	brought	to	the	surface	of	Soviet	political	life	the	accumulated	grievances	of
seventy	years	and	eventuated	in	the	disintegration	of	the	Soviet	state,	which,	contrary	to
widespread	opinion	in	contemporary	Russia,	was	not	a	Western	policy	objective	–	not	even	of	the
Reagan	administration.
In	the	middle	and	late	1980s	the	Soviet	Union	remained	a	military	superpower	just	as	capable	of
annihilating	the	US	and	its	allies	in	a	nuclear	war	as	the	US	was	of	destroying	the	USSR.	Mutually
Assured	Destruction	remained	the	order	of	the	day,	although	Ronald	Reagan	agreed	with
Gorbachev	that	this	precarious	balance	of	terror	was	indeed	mad.	To	the	horror	of	Margaret	Thatcher,	they	came
close	to	agreeing	at	Reykjavik	in	1986	a	policy	of	ridding	the	world	of	nuclear	weapons.
Thatcher,	however,	played	a	far	more	significant	role	in	the	ending	of	the	Cold	War	than	a	‘realist’	analysis	would
lead	one	to	expect,	given	the	disparity	between	Britain’s	military	power	and	that	of	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet
Union.	Although	nothing	was	said	in	public	about	it	at	the	time,	Thatcher	and	the	British	government	decided	in	the
autumn	of	1983	to	seek	dialogue	with	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	countries	of	Eastern	Europe.	It	was	a	change	of
course	which	led	the	following	year	to	the	Prime	Minister	hosting	Mikhail	Gorbachev	at	Chequers	three	months
before	he	became	Soviet	leader.
Thus	began	the	triangular	political	relationship.	Thatcher	was	already	Reagan’s	favourite	foreign	leader	by	far.	That
was	part	of	the	reason	why	she	became	Gorbachev’s	most	important	European	partner	–	until	1990	when	the
urgency	and	salience	of	the	German	Question	meant	that	Helmut	Kohl	mattered	more	(although	at	no	point	did
Thatcher	have	as	close	a	relationship	with	President	George	H.W.	Bush	as	she	had	enjoyed	with	Reagan).
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Two	Reagan	speeches	in	March	1983	had	made	the	Cold	War	still	colder.	In	the	first	of	these	he	described	the
Soviet	Union	as	an	‘evil	empire’	and	said	that	the	Cold	War	was	a	‘struggle	between	right	and	wrong	and	good	and
evil’.	In	the	second,	he	announced	that	the	USA	was	embarking	on	a	project	to	create	anti-ballistic	missile	defence,
although	for	many	observers,	this	Strategic	Defense	Initiative	(SDI,	or,	in	popular	parlance,	‘Star	Wars’)	was	a
contravention	of	the	1972	Anti-Ballistic	Missile	Treaty.	That	was	the	Soviet	view	and	their	leadership	saw	it	as	an
attempt	to	give	the	US	a	nuclear	first-strike	capacity.
The	Prime	Minister	shared	Reagan’s	beliefs	in	the	severity	of	a	Soviet	threat	and	sympathised	with	his	desire	to	go
on	the	ideological	offensive.	She	had,	however,	serious	worries	about	SDI.	She	was	careful	not	to	contradict
Reagan	too	blatantly	in	public,	but	in	private	(and	with	greater	tact	than	she	displayed	when	dealing	with	Cabinet
ministers	at	home)	she	made	clear	her	misgivings	about	SDI.
Up	until	1983,	both	as	Leader	of	the	Opposition	and	throughout	her	first	term	as	Prime	Minister,	Thatcher	had
remained	sceptical	of	the	idea	that	summit	talks	between	the	leaders	of	the	two	‘superpowers’	could	do	any	good
and	she	had	been	wary	of	closer	contact	with	the	Communist	world.	When	Leonid	Brezhnev	died	in	November
1982	after	eighteen	years	as	Soviet	leader,	the	Foreign	Secretary	Francis	Pym,	with	whom	Thatcher’s	relations
were	frosty,	tried	unsuccessfully	to	persuade	her	to	attend	the	funeral.
The	Foreign	Office	and	the	Prime	Minister’s	official	advisers	were	concerned	at	how	overwrought	East-West
relations	had	become.	The	dangers	of	this	were	underlined	when	Oleg	Gordievsky,	the	KGB	officer	who	was
working	for	MI6,	warned	of	worries	in	Moscow	that	a	forthcoming	1983	NATO	exercise,	‘Able	Archer’,	might	be	a
cover	for	a	surprise	attack	on	the	Soviet	Union.	The	plans	were	subsequently	modified	to	make	it	clear	that	this
was,	indeed,	only	an	exercise.	In	times	of	high	tension,	the	dangers	of	one	side	believing	that	the	other	might	be
about	to	launch	a	surprise	nuclear	attack	were	obvious.	It	would	have	an	incentive	to	get	its	‘retaliation’	in	first.
Thatcher	dismissed	Pym	as	Foreign	Secretary	in	June	1983	and	appointed	Sir	Geoffrey	Howe	as	his	successor.
Although	she	was	never	close	to	Howe	and	their	relations	deteriorated,	initially	they	were	less	fraught	than	with
Pym.	The	Prime	Minister,	however,	held	the	Foreign	Office	in	low	esteem,	believing	it	to	be	too	ready	to
compromise	and	not	robust	enough	with	the	Soviet	Union.	It	took	some	skilful	internal	diplomacy	by	two	of	the	top
officials	in	10	Downing	Street	–	Foreign	Policy	Advisor	Sir	Anthony	Parsons	and	Private	Secretary	to	the	Prime
Minister	John	Coles	–	to	persuade	Thatcher	that	it	was	time	to	re-examine	Britain’s	(and	thus	her)	relations	with
Communist	Europe.
The	Prime	Minister	decided	to	devote	the	whole	of	8	September	1983	to	a	Chequers	seminar	on	trends	in	the
Soviet	Union	and	Eastern	Europe	and	on	the	UK’s	relations	with	these	Communist	states,	for	which	the	Foreign
Office,	Ministry	of	Defence	and	outside	experts	would	produce	papers	in	advance.	The	FCO	had	presented	her	with
a	list	of	experts	to	be	invited,	who	included	mainly	people	from	within	their	own	ranks.	These	she	roundly	rejected.
The	eight	who	were	invited	(including	the	present	author)	were	all	outside	specialists,	seven	of	them	university
teachers.
That	seminar,	which	the	Prime	Minister	chaired,	was	a	turning-point.	Cabinet	Office	documents,	now	declassified,
speak	of	‘a	new	policy’	of	engagement	which	would	be	embarked	upon	but	not	publicly	announced.	The	academics
were	somewhat	bolder	than	the	FCO	in	the	range	of	possible	future	change	they	could	see	occurring,	but	they
reinforced	the	Foreign	Office	view	that	isolating	the	Soviet	Union	was	counter-productive.	Thatcher	was	persuaded
that	the	time	had	come	for	high-level	contact	with	the	Eastern	half	of	the	European	continent.	As	part	of	the	new
policy	of	engagement,	she	went	to	Hungary	in	early	1984	and,	in	the	course	of	a	single	year,	Foreign	Secretary
Geoffrey	Howe	visited	every	Warsaw	Pact	capital.
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In	June	1984	an	invitation	was	issued	specifically	to	Mikhail	Gorbachev,	who	had	become	number	two	in	the	Soviet
Communist	Party	hierarchy,	to	visit	Britain.	He	came	in	December	of	that	year.	His	lunch	and	five-hour	discussion
with	the	Prime	Minister	at	Chequers,	and	subsequent	meetings	with	ministers,	Opposition	leaders	and	business
people,	in	the	course	of	an	intensive	week,	gave	a	huge	boost	to	the	new	policy	of	engagement.	Charles	Powell,
who	had	succeeded	John	Coles	as	private	secretary,	reported	that	the	Prime	Minister	had	been	‘elated’	by	the	visit.
Her	interpreter	Tony	Bishop	wrote	a	mostly	perceptive	assessment	of	Gorbachev	for	the	Cabinet	Office,	delivered
on	3	January	1985,	in	which	he	remarked	on	Gorbachev’s	self-assurance,	energy	and	personal	magnetism,	noting
his	skill	in	defusing	tension	‘in	a	disarmingly	straightforward,	unpolemical	manner’,	with	‘apt,	often	humorous	turns
of	phrase	to	register	his	point’.	Bishop	added:		‘A	roguish	twinkle	was	never	far	from	his	eye	(he	even	once	winked
at	me	over	his	shoulder	as	I	interpreted	a	neat	parry	of	his	to	one	of	the	Prime	Minister’s	verbal	thrusts)’.	Thatcher
lost	no	time	in	reporting	on	Gorbachev	to	Reagan	at	a	specially	convened	Camp	David	meeting.
On	domestic	policy	Margaret	Thatcher	was	a	deeply	divisive	figure	in	British	politics.	To	the	extent	that	she	had
begun	working	to	improve	East-West	relations,	she	was	much	more	in	tune	with	a	broad	swath	of	public	opinion.
Labour	Party	criticism,	and,	in	more	guarded	form,	that	of	some	of	her	own	ministers	and	MPs,	was	that	she	had
too	closely	aligned	herself	with	Reagan’s	Cold	War	intransigence	and	had	failed	to	recognize	the	danger	of	a	drift
towards	nuclear	war.	Only	a	minority	of	zealots	within	her	own	party	wanted	her	to	continue	to	eschew	attempts	to
improve	relations	with	the	USSR.
From	her	Chequers	meeting	with	Gorbachev	in	December	1984	onwards,	Thatcher	never	missed	an	opportunity	to
resume	their	dialogue.	At	Chernenko’s	funeral	in	March	1985	she	greatly	exceeded	the	time	allocated	for	her
meeting	with	the	new	Soviet	leader	and	told	him	that	his	visit	to	Britain	had	been	‘one	of	the	most	successful	ever’.
Her	enthusiasm	was	such	that	a	Foreign	Office	official,	reading	the	note	about	the	meeting,	observed	that	‘the	PM
seems	to	go	uncharacteristically	weak	at	the	knees	when	she	talks	to	the	personable	Mr	Gorbachev’.	At	the	time,
that	was	an	untypical	FCO	response,	but	by	1989	Thatcher	had	become	even	more	enthusiastically	in	favour	of
engagement	with	the	fast-changing	Communist	world	than	were	the	diplomats	and	still	more	pro-Gorbachev	than
the	FCO	she	had	earlier	scorned	as	too	soft.
Among	those	concerned	by	Thatcher’s	trajectory	was	her	Foreign	Policy	Adviser	Sir	Percy	Cradock,	who
succeeded	Parsons	in	that	role	in	1984.	Following	a	much-acclaimed	visit	the	Prime	Minister	made	to	the	Soviet
Union	in	March	1987,	he	said	he	found	it	‘harder	to	talk	about	Gorbachev	with	her	entirely	objectively’,	for	her
‘formidable	powers	of	self-identification	and	advocacy	were	enlisted	on	his	behalf’.	Cradock	believed	that	Thatcher
became	‘dangerously	attached	to	Gorbachev	in	his	domestic	role’.
His	apprehensions	were	misplaced.	If	Gorbachev’s	attempts	to	achieve	a	qualitatively	better	relationship	with	the
United	States	and	with	Western	Europe,	while	he	simultaneously	pursued	radical	political	reform	at	home,	had	met
with	continuing	intransigence,	it	is	inconceivable	that	he	could	have	liberalized	and	democratized	the	Soviet	political
system	to	the	extent	he	did.	He	could	hardly	have	declared,	as	he	did	at	the	UN	in	1988,	that	the	people	of	every
country	had	the	right	to	decide	for	themselves	what	kind	of	system	they	wished	to	live	in.	And	if	Gorbachev	and	the
more	benign	international	environment	had	not	raised	expectations	in	Eastern	Europe,	both	regimes	and	peoples
would	have	continued	to	believe	that	any	attempt	to	move	out	of	the	Soviet	orbit	would	be	to	invite	military
repression,	making	a	bad	situation	worse.
There	were	deep	divisions	within	the	Reagan	administration	over	its	Soviet	policy,	with	George	Shultz	and	the	State
Department	eager	for	dialogue	with	the	Soviet	leadership	but	the	Defense	Department	under	Caspar	Weinberger
and	the	highest	echelons	of	the	CIA	convinced	that	little	more	than	cosmetic	change	was	occurring	in	Moscow	and
that	the	threat	remained	as	great	as	ever.	Some	officials	argued	that	because	of	his	charm,	Gorbachev	was	an
especially	dangerous	enemy,	for	he	was	seducing	the	Europeans.
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It	mattered	that	Thatcher,	with	anti-Communist	credentials	as	formidable	as	Reagan’s	(he	described	her	as	‘the	only
European	leader	I	know	with	balls’),	threw	her	weight	behind	those	favouring	engagement	with	the	Soviet	Union,
telling	the	president	that	Gorbachev	was	a	different	kind	of	Soviet	leader	from	any	seen	before.	Thatcher’s
significance	in	the	process	of	the	Cold	War’s	ending	was	not	because	she	was	unique	among	British	politicians	in
believing	that,	with	Gorbachev	in	the	Kremlin,	there	was	potential	for	qualitative	improvement	in	East-West
relations.	Foreign	Secretary	Geoffrey	Howe	was	just	as	alert	to	these	possibilities,	Labour	Shadow	Foreign
Secretary	Denis	Healey	even	more	so.	Thatcher’s	role	was	distinctively	important	because	no	alternative
Conservative	leader,	still	less	a	Labour	leader,	would	have	enjoyed	such	a	close	and	influential	relationship	with
Reagan.	On	several	occasions	he	referred	to	her	as	a	‘soulmate’,	and	when	she	spoke	well	of	someone,	he
listened.
It	is	highly	questionable,	moreover,	whether	an	alternative	British	prime	minister	would	have	made	such	a	strong
impact	on	Gorbachev.	He	related	her	criticisms	of	past	Soviet	behaviour	to	the	Politburo,	telling	them	they	were
something	to	ponder	(rather	than	dismiss	out	of	hand,	as	his	predecessors	would	have	done).	Gorbachev	was
impressed	by	how	closely	Thatcher	followed	Soviet	developments	and	he	appreciated	the	way	she	spoke	positively
of	the	recent	changes	within	the	USSR	,	and	of	his	role,	when	speaking	with	conservative	leaders	in	other
European	capitals	and	in	Washington,	and	also	when	she	was	addressing	Soviet	audiences.	When	they	met,
Thatcher’s	vigour	in	argument	was	for	Gorbachev	a	plus	rather	than	a	minus.	He	liked	her	willingness	to	say	what
she	thought,	and	he	revelled	in	the	cut	and	thrust.	Their	animated	discussions	only	strengthened	their	mutual
esteem,	as	interpreters	and	notetakers	at	their	meetings	have	testified.
No	British	prime	minister	had	more	frequent	meetings	with	American	presidents	than	had	Thatcher	with	Reagan
and	his	successor	George	H.W.	Bush.	None	had	as	many	meetings	with	a	Soviet	leader	as	did	Thatcher	–	not	even
Winston	Churchill	with	his	wartime	ally,	Stalin.	Her	official	Foreign	Policy	Adviser	Cradock,	as	we	have	seen,
thought	she	had	become	too	admiring	of	Gorbachev.	His	summing-up	of	her	role	in	East-West	relations	has,
accordingly,	a	disapproving	edge,	yet	it	points	to	the	surprisingly	large	part	she	played	during	the	years	in	which	the
Cold	War	reached	a	peaceful,	negotiated	conclusion.	Thatcher,	observed	Cradock,	‘acted	as	a	conduit	from
Gorbachev	to	Reagan,	selling	him	in	Washington	as	a	man	to	do	business	with,	and	operating	as	an	agent	of
influence	in	both	directions’.
___________________
Note:	The	arguments	in	this	blog	are	presented	at	greater	length,	and	the	references	provided,	in	the	author’s	latest
book,	The	Human	Factor:	Gorbachev,	Reagan,	and	Thatcher,	and	the	End	of	the	Cold	War	(Oxford	University
Press,	2020).
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